Under the current constitutional
arrangements in this country, or lack thereof, the governing party in
Parliament can pretty much do what it wants to engineer the society that best
promotes its interests. Even the voting
system supports that.
Under MMP, the
government of the day can bypass the voter and hand pick much of the
legislature and Cabinet. The government
appoint the judges, so if their legislative decisions run contrary to the
judicial view, they rewrite
the legislation. If a caucus becomes
argumentative, the PM can shuffle Cabinet and play his constituent MPs off
against his list members.
Yes, at the
macro level, a
government in power in New Zealand today can now pretty much do what it wants.
And by and large the Pākeha majority will let them do it.
However,
things become less clear in their dealings with Māori. The Māori world is complex to many Māori;
imagine how frightening it must be to Pākeha with little or no knowledge of
things Māori. In response to these fears
from its voter base, government deals with Māori from a
risk management perspective. And
to help them manage that risk they use two methods; advisory and mandatory.
The advisory
method involves setting up and resourcing Māori to fill committees
and positions that
government can then call upon to advise them on how to manage and neutralise,
if not solve, a particular Māori risk.
The
mandatory method involves mandating and resourcing Māori negotiators
that the government can then call upon to deliver
a constituency of other Māori into its hands, again neutralising, if
not solving, particular Māori risks.
The success of both methods hinges upon the appointed Māori advisors and mandated Māori
negotiators playing the game by the government’s rules and giving the
government what it wants.
With regard
to Māori negotiators, what government want is to be forgiven the massive
financial liability it carries over the numerous, well-founded claims that
Māori have against it for breaching Te
Tiriti o Waitangi. And it wants to
do so for as little as one cent in the dollar.
It had aimed
to complete this exercise of self-determined forgiveness by
2014. It has now quietly changed
that deadline to 2017, but its methodology remains the same.
It mandates
a group of negotiators who originally got their people’s support with stirring
rhetoric such as, “100 percent and not an acre less.”
It then
isolates those negotiators from their people through confidentiality
requirements, refuses to discuss anything outside its settlement
policy, and threatens to send them to the ‘back
of the settlement queue’ if they don’t toe the line.
Finally it
resources them to take its cheapo offer back to their people and manufacture their consent by telling them, "Take the
deal. It’s the
best we can do.” And it watches
the resultant
backlash against those negotiators or their supporters with calm detachment because it too
is playing the same game, but on the international scene; i.e. manufacturing our consent to deliver the New Zealand constituency into the hands of multinational corporates.